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SEQUESTERING WITNESSES:
DOES THE PRACTICE INTERFERE WITH
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. I/
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense. 2/
Since you're under oath, sir, at this
point, you discuss nothing with anyone, not
even your lawyer because he's finished with
you. As of now, you don't discuss your
testimony with anybody, you understand? 3/
In criminal cases, but from time to time in civil
cases, too, a court can order lawyers not to consult with
their clients. This usually happens when a client is on
cross and the court declares a recess or adjourns for the
day.
I was never comfortable with this procedure and
never understood it, even when, as a young Assistant United
States Attorney, I requested this order myself.
Sequestering witnesses has ancient roots and has
been accepted procedure for hundreds of years. It is not
I_/ Harold Baer, Jr., is a justice of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York. Nina Koenigsberg, a second-year law
student at New York Law School and a 1985 summer intern, and
Steven A. Adler, a third-year law student at New York
University School of Law and a 1984-85 intern, helped him
prepare this article. This article first appeared in Trial,
July, 1986, pp. 99-102, and is reprinted here with
permission.
2/ U.S. Const. amend. VI.
3/ Jackson v. United States, 420 A.2d 1202, 1203 (D.C.
1979) (en banc).
uncommon for a witness to be put under "the rule" V in
courtrooms today. The problem arises when the witness is
the defendant; then, perhaps, there is a conflict with the
sixth amendment to the Constitution.
Sequestration is believed to be rooted in the
biblical story of Susanna. Susanna, accused of adultery by
two elders, was defended by Daniel, who spoke to the assem-
bly: "Are ye such fools, ye sons of Israel, that without
examination or knowledge of the truth ye have condemned a
daughter of Israel?. . . Put these two aside, one far from
another, and I will examine them." 5/ Heard separately, the
witnesses gave different stories, and Susanna was vindicated.
A second source of sequestration is found in early
Germanic law, which was incorporated into the English common
law well before the jury system came into being.
The aim of sequestration has been to prevent one
witness from tailoring his testimony to that of another.
Sequestering a witness can help ensure candor and, more to
the point, "Sequestering a witness over a recess called
before testimony is completed serves . . . [to prevent]
improper attempts to influence the testimony in light of the
testimony already given." 6/
The rule was unchallenged in early cases in the
United States, although, as in England, exceptions were made
with respect to lawyers who were to be witnesses 7/ and
_/ This section draws heavily on 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§1837 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1976). See also 22 English and
Empire Digest 498 (1974); 10 Halsburys Laws of England 417
(3d ed. 1955); 15 Halsbury's Laws of England 439 (3d ed.
1955), 2 J. Taylor, Evidence 956 (11th ed. 1920) 1 J.
Greenleaf, Evidence 705 (1897).
5/ Quoted in 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence 455-56.
6_/ Geders v. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1335 (1976).
7/ State v. Brookshire, 2 Ala. 303 (1841); State v. Ward,
17 A.483 (Vt. 1899). See also 2 J. Taylor, Evidence; 1
J. Greenleaf, Evidence.
witnesses who were parties to the action. 8/ This testimony
was not automatically forbidden; rather, the decision to
allow it was left to the discretion of the courts. 9/
In an interesting, seemingly contradictory,
application of the rule, a court in 1891 found that it was
not error to permit the district attorney to confer with a
prosecution witness even while on the stand--"This is his
privilege, and, moreover, may be regarded as his duty"--but
"[a defense] witness should not be called from the stand
while giving his evidence to be spoken to by counsel. This
would be bad practice and subject to great abuse." 10/
Citing no previous case law, the idea that a
defendant could be prohibited from consulting with his
lawyer was strengthened in a 1922 Michigan case that forbade
consultation when a recess interrupted cross-examina-
tion. ii/
As a criminal defendant's access to counsel was
being limited while he was on the witness stand, a different
line of cases that strengthened the right to assistance of
counsel was developing.
8/ Georgia Rail and Banking Co. v. Tice, 52 S.E. 916 (Ga.
1905); Hughes v. State, 148 S.W. 543 (Tenn. 1912). See also
J. Wigmore, Evidence, which suggests that defendants be
required to testify first as a way to avoid the problems
likely to ensue if a defendant hears other witnesses before
testifying. This was held unconstitutional in Brooks v.
Tennessee, 92 S.Ct. 1981 (1972).
9/ Brookshire, 2 Ala. 303; Laughlin v. State, 18 Ohio 99
(1849); Bulliner v. State, 95 Ill. 394 (1849); Bulliner v.
State, 95 Ill. 394 (1880); Lassiter v. State, 67 Ga. 739
(1881); Wilson v. State, 52 Ala. 299 (1875). See also 6 J.
Wigmore, Evidence 456-57, which states that while seques-
tering a witness has been discretionapy since early English
common law, it has never been denied. Wigmore further notes
that a few courts consider it a matter of right. See Fed.
R. Evid. 615.
10/ Williams v. State, 35 Tex. 355, 356 (1871).
11/ People v. Prevost, 189 N.W. 92 (Mich. 1922).
In Powell v. Alabama, 12/ the Supreme Court held
that a defendant had the right to counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. A defendant did not need to
show how and to what extent he had been prejudiced by a
restriction on his right to consult with counsel.
In Glasser v. United States, the Supreme Court
wrote that assistance of counsel was "too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as
to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." 13/
In United States v. Venuto, the Third Circuit
recognized the broad discretionary powers of the trial judge
in conducting a trial, but found "no justification for
imposing a restriction of silence between accused and
counsel during [an 18-hour] trial recess" 14/ in a criminal
case, and found that, as a result of the restriction, the
defendant's sixth-amendment right to assistance of counsel
had been denied. At least one jurisdiction expanded the
Venuto and Glasser decisions to include civil cases. 15/
The unlimited right of defendants to speak with
their lawyers at any time, however, has not been universally
accepted. In a California case where the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, requiring a defendant to answer questions
put to him on cross-examination without conferring with his
lawyer was held valid. 16/ A Georgia trial judge was upheld
12/ 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); State v. Lindsey, 106 N.E.2d 230
(Ind. 1952).
13/ 62 S.Ct. 457, 467 (1942), reh'g denied, in Kretske v.
United States, 62 S.Ct. 629 (1942).
14/ 182 F.2d 519, 522 (3d Cir. 1950). See also
Commonwealth v. Werner, 214 A.2d 276 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965)
(extending Venuto to the Pennsylvania state courts).
15/ Thompson v. Atlantic Building Corp., 107 A.2d 784
(D.C. 1954).
16/ People v. Miller, 8 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1960), cert. denied, 81 S.Ct. 755 (1961).
when he refused a request to allow consultation during
interrupted testimony. 7/
The Supreme Court has concluded that not all
constitutional errors are significant and that "harmless"
errors do not require automatic reversal. 1_/ That same
year, 1967, the Second Circuit narrowed the holding in
Venuto to long recesses and held that a defendant-witness
could be sequestered, or "put under the rule," during an
hour-and-a-half recess. 19/ Although the court was trou-
bled, it would not reverse the conviction because it could
"discern no actual harm to the right to effective assistance
of counsel." 10 In another Second Circuit case, a judge
who had not been informed that a defendant-witness wished to
speak with his lawyer during a recess, was allowed to deny
the defendant access to counsel. 21/
In 1974, in United States v. Fink, the Supreme
Court considered whether a trial court's order directing a
criminal defendant-witness not to consult with his lawyer
during a 17-hour overnight recess deprived the defendant of
his sixth-amendment rights. The lower court had upheld the
conviction because the defendant had not shown preju-
dice. 2Z/ The Supreme Court reversed.
Two years later in Geders, writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Burger recognized the power of the
trial judge to control the progress of a trial, including
the power to sequester nonparty witnesses. 23/ The Court
found, however, "A sequestration order affects a defendant
_/ Emmett v. State, 205 S.E.2d 231 (Ga. 1974).
j8/ Chapman v. California 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967).
L9/ United States v. Leighton, 386 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied. 88 S.Ct. 1412 (1968).
20/ Leighton, 386 F.2d 822, 823.
21/ United States. v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 1018 (1969).
J 502 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974).
23/ 96 S.Ct. 1330.
in quite a different way from the way it affects a non-party
witness . . . a defendant in a criminal case must often
consult with his attorney during the trial. 4/ The Court
noted it was common practice for a defendant to consult with
his lawyer during an overnight recess to review the day's
events and make tactical decisions. The Court wrote--
To the extent that conflict remains between the
defendant's right to consult with his attorney during a
long overnight recess in the trial, and the prosecu-
tor's desire to cross-examine the defendant with-
out . . . the risk of improper "coaching," the conflict
must, under the Sixth Amendment, be resolved in favor
of the right to assistance and guidance of counsel. 2/
The Court referred to sequestration during a short
recess with approval 1/ while Justice Marshall, in a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Brennan, suggested that
the length of the recess was beside the point:
I do not understand the Court's observation as
suggesting that as a general rule no constitutional
infirmity would inhere in an order barring communica-
tion between a defendant and his attorney during a
"brief routine recess." In my view, the general
principles adopted by the Court today are fully appli-
cable to the analysis of any order barring communica-
tion between a defendant and his attorney, at least
where that communication would not interfere with the
orderly and expeditious progress of the trial. 2_/
Not surprisingly, courts have been asked to apply
Geders when a judge denied the defendant access to his
lawyer during a short recess. In general, courts have
followed a Fourth Circuit decision which holds that "a
restriction on a defendant's right to consult with his
attorney during a brief routine recess is constitutionally
g4/ Id. at 1335.
25 Id. at 1337.
jZ/ Id. at 1337 n.2.
27/ Id. at 1337.
impermissible. .... " 2/ The Second Circuit has reaffirmed
its earlier position, finding that "it is error to bar a
defendant from consulting his counsel during any trial
recess," Z/ but declined to reverse the conviction automat-
ically, concluding that some showing of prejudice was
necessary. The Fifth Circuit held that "depriving a crimi-
nal defendant of the right to consult with counsel during
court recesses--regardless of how brief the recesses may
be--violates the constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel." _0/ The Sixth Circuit held that an order
barring contact during a lunch recess was unconstitutional
under Powell, 1_1/ and the Eighth Circuit noted that it had
"grave doubts that even a brief restriction on a defendant's
right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth
Amendment." IZ/
At first blush, these decisions seem to presage a
clear trend, but close inspection of recent cases suggests
otherwise. Access of defendants to their lawyers during
recesses remains limited; although finding error where the
court barred a defendant from speaking with his attorney
during a brief recess, the Second Circuit refrained from
reversing the lower court, holding that there was "not even
a remote risk of actual prejudice," 2V because the defen-
dant had had opportunities to consult with his lawyer during
other recesses and neither the defendant nor his lawyer had
requested permission to consult. The Third Circuit has said
that a defendant must demonstrate a desire to meet with
28/ United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630, 634 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1179 (1977).
,/ United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 148 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied sub nom. Ladmer v. United States, 102
S.Ct. 1427 (1982).
20/ United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir.
1980).
21/ United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir.
1976).
21 United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1978).
33/ DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 148.
counsel or show that he would have met with counsel to fit
within the Geders or Venuto 14/ guidelines. The Fourth
Circuit has followed this line of reasoning, too, finding
that "it was incumbent upon the petitioner to show that he
desired to consult with his attorney, and would have con-
sulted with him but for the restriction placed upon him by
the trial judge." 15/
A review of post-Geders state criminal cases
reveals a clear pattern of reversals where the recess was
overnight or longer and some prejudice was shown. This is
so regardless of a timely protest; 1/ conversely, a timely
objection obviates the need to show prejudice. 17/
No such unanimity exists when the court has
prohibited access to counsel during a brief recess. A
minority of states, following the view of Justices Marshall
and Brennan, hold that it is reversible error to prohibit a
defendant from consulting with his lawyer during a brief
recess, and this is so whether or not prejudice was demon-
strated and whether or not defendant failed to timely
object. I/ The majority of states, however, take a less
expansive view of Geders, finding no reversible error
stemming from a short recess in the absence of a showing of
prejudice. 29
14/ Bailey v. Redman, 657 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S.Ct. 1024 (1982) (if defendant had timely
objected, prejudice need not be established).
15/ Strubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1879 (1983).
16/ Bailey v. State, 422 A.2d 956 (Del. 1980); Mastracchio
v. Houle, 416 A.2d 116 (R.I. 1980).
q_/ People v. Noble, 248 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1969); State v.
Fusco, 461 A.2d 1169 (N.J. 1983).
38/ Jackson v. United States, 420 A.2d 1202 (D.C. 1978)
(en banc); People v. Iqaz, 326 N.W.2d 420 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982), remanded on othegrounds, 341 N.W.2d 467 (Mich.
1983).
39/ Crutchfield v. State, 431 So.2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); People v. Sanders, 472 N.E.2d 1156 (.Ill. App.
New York courts, to the limited extent that they
have addressed the issue, appear to side with the majority.
The New York Court of Appeals recently found no abuse of
discretion when the trial court refused to permit a short
recess so that the criminal defendant could confer with his
lawyer immediately after a ruling that allowed the prosecu-
tor to ask the defendant a question to which a negative
answer would have precluded any more inquiry. 4_/ The New
York appellate courts have not yet ruled on whether the
constitutional guarantee to assistance of counsel is consis-
tent with limiting a defendant's access to counsel during a
short recess where there is no question or line of questions
pending. In New York, to prevail on appeal, there must be a
timely protest, and probably some showing of prejudice. Al /
On the civil side, a blanket sequestration order
was held to violate a litigant's constitutional right to
assistance of counsel. 42/ But denial of a plaintiff's
right to consult with counsel during a short recess, while
held to be an abuse of discretion and violative of pro-
cedural due process, was not reversible error absent timely
objection or a showing of prejudice. A ,
Ct. 1984); Lock v. State, 403 N.E.2d 1360 (Ind. 1980); Pope
v. State, 440 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1982); State v. Perry, 299
S.E.2d 324 (S.C. 1983).
AD/ People v. Naravan, 444 N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y. 1981) on
remand, 449 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), aff'd, 460
N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. 1983).
4/ Naravan, 444 N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y. 1981).
1 Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 78 (1980) (trial
court prohibited defendant from consulting with counsel for
seven days); but see, Stocker Hinge Mfq. Co. v. Darnel
Indus. Inc., 377 N.E.2d 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (overnight
recess; must show prejudice).
43/ Cartin v. Continental Homes of New Hampshire, 360 A.2d
96 (Vt. 1976); but see, In re Asbestos Liti ation, 492 A.2d
256 (Del. 1985) (lawyer-deponent consultation during recess
in deposition prohibited).
This analysis, for me at least, presents some good
news and some bad news. The good news is that as a young
prosecutor, I was well within the law in seeking to prohibit
lawyers from consulting with their defendant-clients while
they were on the witness stand during a brief recess. The
bad news is that the opinion of Justices Marshall and
Brennan in Geders seems the more enlightened view on the
subject. Unfortunately, at present, it is the minority
view.
CRIME AND HEREDITY
"In our society variation in hair length is
largely attributable to the fact that some people have their
hair cut shorter than others. In most cases, moreover, men
cut their hair shorter than women. This means that if you
are born with two X chromosomes your hair usually ends up
longer than if you are born with an X and a Y chromosome.
In a statistical sense, therefore, the presence or absence
of a Y chromosome predicts much of the variation in hair
length--let us say 60 percent. But the fact that genes
currently predict hair length fairly accurately tells us
nothing about society's ability to alter hair length. If
men and women became convinced that equal hair length was
important, achieving this result would be no harder than
making hair length equal among males alone. Likewise, if
some zealot decided that shorter (or longer) hair would
contribute to human happiness, he would be a fool to abandon
his campaign simply because someone pointed out that peo-
ple's genes currently "explained" 60 percent of the varia-
tion in hair length. And if some social scientist read a
study showing that genes explained 60 percent of the varia-
tion in hair length, he would be an even greater fool to
conclude, as many now do, that environmental influences
explained only 40 percent. Environmental variation (in the
way people have their hair cut) would explain virtually all
the variation in hair length, despite the fact that genetic
variation explained 60 percent.
Similar problems arise when we try to analyze the
effects of genes on crime.. ....
From "Genes and Crime" by Christopher Jeicks, New York
Review of Books, February 12, 1987, pp. 33, 34; a review of
two new books on criminology.
